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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
i-'iaimixi:^  ci;;u Appellants, 
EUGEMIO T'"'' 13O.MES0, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF "F " -P^ I . ^MTS 
STATEMENT C? THE :iAIU3E OF THE CASE 
:•: oellants, State •?- Utah ard Sally M. Martinez, appeal from 
a*1^ crdar rer -red acramst anr-^e ^  \ ~^—_--. i ^  r^  i i M ; L* * - r 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting respondent's 
!*otio:: . ;imiss> ,:_»:•.! thcrcl / IvirrW-c: • ^ v action to establish paternity 
of co-plaintiff' s minor child. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOV1ER COURT 
Following the filir.q and serving of the complaint co initiate 
paternity proceedings,. *-•';* c^ur di^ru^t^. the -:~ta'^ h~s-*' <:«=?c r^:a-
ant's claim "that the statute of limitations had run. The court held 
that a paterni ty action v/as controlled by Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22, 
RLLILF SLIGHT 0^ ; APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of t. .? lower COK^Z.-^ ..•:.'J; 
meraoranduin decision holding "that the establishment of paternity and the 
No. 14573 
liability to support does not exist unless the action is carrmenced within 
eight years and request that this case be regarded and the complaint 
reinstated so as to permit the processes of the court action to take 
place. 
STATEMENT CF FACTS 
The co-plaintiff, Sally M. Martinez, gave birth to a child 
out of wedlock on January 25, 1968. Co-plaintiff and defendant, Eugenio 
Max Rcmero, were not married at the time of birth or conception of the 
child and defendant has refused to acknowledge said child as his own. 
The State of Utah and Sally M. Martinez filed a ccmplaint 
against the defendant on the 27th day of January, 1976, alleging that 
the defendant was the father of co-plaintiff's illegitimate child and, 
as such, was to be declared the legal and natural father of the child 
and was liable for the reasonable expenses of pregnancy and confinement 
of co-plaintiff and the education and necessary support of said child 
by virtue of Utah Code Annotated 78-4Ea-l (1953, as amended 1965). The 
State seeks judgment against the defendant in the amount of Four Thou-
sand One Hundred Dollars ($4,100.00) for the aforementioned expenses 
which were provided for co-plaintiff and her minor child frcm February, 
1972, through January, 1976, by the Social Services Department, and 
that the defendant also be ordered to pay the amount of Seventy-five 
Dollars ($75.00) per month as reasonable support and maintenance for 
the child. 
This case came before the court on defendant's motion to dis-
miss. After taking the matter under advisenent, the court ruled that Utah 
Code Ann. 78-12-22 controlled all actions for the establishment of 
paternity. 
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ARGUMENT .•• 
POINT I ;"' 
A FATHER OV'ES TIJF SAME 01/'Y OF SUPPORT T" 
BOTH LEGITIMATE AHD ILEEG; TE'AT1; CHILDREN. 
" •" Vnctard was saim; to he }!f ilius ..I'IE 
the child of noLoc\ , -;.i "ij-i^r; oonnll." -y. <_•
 s .•--'-
"
: f
 essence, the illegitimate child nad no Aether known to the 
lav -.!. -.:- j ; Li- ..:. •. ;; •* si " er^ * ' • =>• '•- .-o '-• . ana a v /stnrcl 
was disqualified from certain ofric :st s Al \ji. Jur. A* .^., -O^ 
MO;-T rt"-:t-:-5 have since mitigated roxe or less the nicer;.; o: 
the cc:~;:. -aw and conferred upon ... i .:.cji ,. = .-• , i. ;.'." •> ../•-.-; 
which, cha: .aw previously eenied. 
471 A } : ; the court', ^.eld thai the words * on, *. o. n •_ _ _-_• i" 
in a wrongful death statute meant that the death action was 
for the benefit of decedei it! s wi f e, husbai id, "chi 1 d or chil d-
ren!t which included Illegitimate as well as legitimate child-
ren of deceased parents: 
,!The reason for this iron. • ^j.fui •• 
becoming progressively more aware that children deserve proper 
ca. . , .!•'": :•']• - = ro ty.-h -i ^ r, t-vr^. i£ they :n" o 1 1 lecritimace* 
The bux Jen ol illegitimacy in purely social r oiatrLc/uniips 
shoulA he nroiv;'\ eithout society adding amiecossar i ly ho the 
bar cier: UJWLU ._-jyu .•_.
 :> > s n* - i.w-:: * - r 
health,, and welfare of children." 
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Utah law is clearly in line with the modern 
trend which recognizes that all children need and deserve 
proper care. Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45(a)(1) of the 
"Uniform Act on Paternity," the father is liable " . . . to 
the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock 
• . . for the education". . . and "necessary support . . . 
of the child." In further clarifying the exact meaning 
of the above cited statute, one must turn to the companion 
statutes to understand the intent of the law. Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-3 states: "Every man shall support his wife 
and his child."(Emphasis added.) "Child," as defined under 
Section 78-45-2(4), "means a son or daughter under the 
age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means." (Emphasis added.) 
Even before the enactment of the above quoted stat-
utes, this court has long recognized the absolute nature 
of the father's support duty: a father has "a positive 
duty to support his minor child." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 
P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236 
P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925), this court stated that "the duty 
of the father to support his children, if he is able to do 
so, is imposed in this state by positive statute. It 
would be his duty in any event if there were no statute upon 
the sub-:'-:"1 ^ r.i.ore recent cas-i, Rees v. Archibald
 f 
6 Utah .... ,,w . : 
- "This court has invariably emphasisec 
the father's obligation to support his 
children based upon the elementary princi-
ple that the law imposes upon those who 
bring children into the world the duty : o 
care for and support them, during their 
minority and dependency.!' ( emphasis added.) 
Given r he eori :n\i:\! - v ] r-"a ;-h--'r * :•. • v . )L 
s u p p o r t end t h e l e g i s l a t i v e g r , ? r t of e q u a l r i g h t s ^. ociuca-
t i o n a: - -;=;..--' ' ^ n r - ^ ^ •-- a"11 ^ ' ' i 1 - ^ ^ (78-4 5a- l , supra) 
i t i s ; . o ; : : : u l c h a t t h e -Le-irjiaeer^. I I U J I J I L 1 • .'.•;- - . . v ' . , 3 
of e a e : 1' ^ r i t i n a t e c h i l d t e such p u r p o r t s h o u l d f o r e v e r be 
b a r r e l : : e r - e y L v e , ) *~ , .d^f ' / I r h i n 
e i g n e yd... : a^ h e l d by t h e l e - 7 er c c u . h l t ^ Lig. , ; , ..:kj 
i l 1 e / i - : r a : » 2 ch i - 1 " f" b? s e o e o r f e d by i t s f a t h e r a^ > opposed 
t o t h a e e f t h e 1,.,. _ : I ^ C J - , - * 
if abrcrille by a statute ;;f limitations which rune uur ir.g 
th*"- v.". .' :': - ire- :: - ~\ ' ••': an action to establish paterni 
and enforce the support duty, 
POINT TT 
TO BAR A PATERNITY ACTION 3Y A CHILD, PARENT, 
OR PUBLIC AGENCY DURING THE CHILD'S MINORITY 
IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
AND OF THE RIGHTS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS 
FOR SUPPORT. 
CT ; hi corn out of wed"': ^ cb have th" same rights 
to support, education, and necessi.ic:; ae ,.• •-* . ^  r~ • .M 
legitimate channels. The laws of ehe Seate oc Utah recogniz 
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all children whether legitimate or not as equals. To buy 
the position of the lower court does away with this recogni-
tion of "equality" and once again places on a child "after 
eight years" the stigma of the early common law of being 
"filius nullius" if an action has not been brought in that 
time period. To take such a position removes from society 
the progress made in the recognition of rights and becomes 
overt-rank discrimination against a child who had no say 
in its conception, birth, or early life. Much too often, a 
young child does not know the legal, moral, societal impli-
cations until several years beyond what the court has held 
is the time for the action to commence. 
The United States Supreme Court entertained ques-
tions on the rights of illegitimate children as compared to 
those of legitimate children in Gomez v. Perez, 4 09 U.S. 
535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973), and drew the following conclusion: 
" . . . Once a state posits a 
judicially enforceable right on behalf 
of children to needed support from their 
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally 
sufficient justification for denying such 
essential right to a child simply because 
/the7 natural father has not married /the7 
mother, and such denial is a denial of equal 
protection." 
What are these "judicially enforceable" rights? 
First of all, the duty of suppoirt was discussed in point one 
of this brief. Rees v. Archibald, supra, specifically spells 
out this duty as does Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l and 78-45-1, 
et seq. Further, the Colorado Supreme Court said as stated 
in Garvin v. Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941): 
"The primary liability of the father to, his minor child al-
ways exists during minority." (Emphasis added J 
Need the "judicially enforceable" rights under 
Utah law be any clearer to fall under the mandate of Gomez? 
No. There must be equality in the application of the right 
to support. The lower court in the case at bar feels other-
wise. The obvious inequality is seen in this case. If the 
child in question had been born of a marriage with a "known" 
father, that child would be able to call upon that father 
for needs and support through its entire minority. However, 
under the logic of the lower court, if the parent, guardian, 
public agency, or child does not bring an action within eight 
years, the child is forever barred from claiming any familial 
relationship to one he could call father. 
I 
What the lower court in effect has done is say 
that an illegitimate child has an equal right to its father's 
support only where suit has been brought on its behalf 
within an eight-year period, whereas the legitimate child's 
right to support extends through its entire minority re-
gardless of any attempt to bring suit to enforce the sup-
port obligation. 
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The defendant based his motion to dismiss on the 
fact that "an essential purpose of the statute of limitations 
is to avoid putting a defending party in an untenable po-
sition. Here, the defendant claims the benefit of the stat-
utes because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for 
him to adequately prove a defense." Although there may be 
problems in defense, the Supreme Court has nonetheless held 
in Gomez, supra, that once the right of support has been 
granted "there is no constitutionally sufficient justifica-
tion for denying such essential right. . . . " Such a de-
nial constitutes a "denial of equal protection." 
There is no indication that the legislature intended 
that there be any exception to the general rule of support. 
Further, mere problems of evidence would hardly justify dis-
crimination between children when dealing with their essen-
tial right to support. Policy aside, it is the plaintiff 
who has the burden of proof and whose task will become in-
creasingly difficult with the passage of time. Defendants 
apprehension in regard to evidence is not sufficient rea-
son for denying children the right of support from their 
natural fathers--not to mention the interests of the state 
and its taxpayers. 
If the rights of legitimate and illegitimate 
children are to be equal, an illegitimate must at all times 
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during its minority be granted the right to prove paternity 
either by iself or through its mother or agency charged with 
its care. Otherwise, the illegitimate child's right to sup-
port depends solely on the diligence of its mother or guard-
ian, whose failure to act would, at an early age, reduce 
him to the status of welfare recipient and deny him forever 
the right to enjoy the economic benefits and social rights 
belonging to its legitimate counterparts* 
That a state may not invidiously discriminate 
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial 
benefits accorded children generally is firmly supported by 
case law. A state may not, for example, create a right 
of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a 
parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit 
of such a right. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 
1509 (1968). Nor may illegitimate children be excluded from 
sharing equally with other children in the recovery of work-
men1 s compensation benefits for the death of their parent. 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 
1400 (1972) . Where, as in the instant case, a continuing 
right to support has been created for all children, a com-
plete bar to action resulting from failure to prove paternity 
within eight years discriminates unfairly against illegiti-
mates. As stated by the court in New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973): 
11
 . . . imposing disabilities on 
the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to in-
dividual responsibility and wrongdoing." 
Thus, this court should not make it more difficult 
for illegitimate children to live in our society than it 
already is. Very few children know the significance of what 
this controversy centers around at the age of eight. There-
fore, not only should this court protect the rights of the 
illegirir.ate child who had no control over its circumstances 
but shouli permit the person or agency broad lee-way to use 
the avail, le laws for the benefit of the child. Ofttimes, 
the no:;/.: of an illegitimate child becomes incensed at the 
fact than sr.e has become pregnant and despises the natural 
father for many years. Should this fact be a bar to the 
mother bringing an action when she realizes there is some 
material and psychological benefit to the child? To say so 
would deny to such children a sacred right of parentage and 
would discriminate against them because of something they had 
no control over. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-12-22 IS NO BAR 
TO BRINGING PATERNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS 
MEANT TO BE A STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS 
OF SUPPORT. 
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The lower court, in its minute entry as well as 
in the final order signed, based the dismissal on the be-
lief that Utah Code Annotated 7 8-12-22 (as amended) controlled 
paternity actions. The pertinent language is as follows: 
11
—Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree 
of any court of the United States, or of 
any state or territory within the United 
States. 
An action to enforce any liability 
due or to become due, for failure to pro-
vide support or maintenance for dependent 
children." (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose of the above statute, as seen by the 
appellants, is not to completely bar the bringing of a 
paternity action to "establish familial relationships" but 
limits only an obligor's liability for support up to eight 
years after a sum certain has been ordered or decreed. The 
statute must be read in light of the intent of the law—to 
allow support for dependents. The language "liability due 
or to become due" was added in 1975 to codify the position 
this court took in Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975). 
In that case, the mother was awarded custody of a minor 
child and defendant was ordered to pay $40 per month for 
its support. The defendant failed to abide by the support 
order and a subsequent action to enforce the order was 
initiated by the woman. His arrearage was $5,8 00 for 
twelve years and one month. Although no action was brought 
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within eight years, this court did not hold that the child 
had lost all right to enforcement of that liability upon 
the amount which was due or to become due; instead, the 
court held that defendant's liability on the arrearage was 
limited to arrearages accumulated within a period of eight 
years—i.e., $3,840 (96 x $40). 
The court in Seely, Id., quoted Simmons v. Simmons, 
105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), as follows: 
"When a judgment is rendered, payable 
in installments, the statute begins to-run 
against the judgment from the time fixed 
for the payment of each installment for the 
part then payable." (Emphasis added.) 
The abe-.-o * anguage demonstrates that the application of Utah 
Code Ar.nc-^ ced 78-12-22 is limited to actions brought to en-
force judgments, orders, or decrees of the court that fix 
sum certain amounts for support. Failure to bring an action 
on this liability due or to become due does not totally 
eliminate a minor's right to receive support payments from 
its father. Instead, it serves to limit the liability due 
to an eight year period. Thus, a minor would not be barred 
from bringing an action beyond the eight year period but 
would be barred from collecting the amounts due beyond the 
statutory limitation. 
Appellants are quick to point out, however, that tne 
eight year statute does not control support obligations in 
paternity matters. The Uniform Paternity Act has specific 
provision for limitation of reimbursement of necessary 
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expenses before the date paternity is established. The 
eight year statute of limitation on liability would not begin 
to run until the liability is fixed by court order. Until 
then, the shorter statute of four years preceding the ac-
tion controls, Utah Code Annotated 7 8-4 5a-3 states: 
11
—The father f s liabilities for past 
education and necessary support are limited 
to a period of four years next preceding 
the commencement of an action." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It would seem only logical from the above language 
that actions for support can be brought beyond the four years 
"next preceding" the cormencenent of the action. Otherwise, 
the phraseology would be meaningless. The same applies to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22. That language limits only the 
amounts due on sums certain. Since the Paternity Act con-
trols the collection of necessities, limiting it to four 
years, the thrust of both statutes is to leave entirely 
alone the matter of "when" a paternity action can be brought. 
The opinion of the lower court which denies the 
natural mother, public agency obligated to provide its care, 
and the child itself to bring actions after an eight year 
period has gone by does not align itself with Utah law which 
provides that support goes until age 21. The Maine Supreme 
Court had a similar situation before it in Harding v. 
Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 134 A. 567 (1926). There, a pater-
nity suit was filed when the illegitimate child was 13 years 
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old. The court held the suit to be timely and said the 
statute of limitations v;as no bar to the action because such 
an obligation is a continuing one and is not over in the 
number of years claimed under the statute of limitations. 
This court should take cognizance from the above 
case. Just like the period of liability for support—8 
years—is a shifting time period, so is the period for es-
tablishing paternity. In the State of Utah, that period goes 
to 21. Whether the moving party is the child, the woman or 
the public agency makes no difference. The entire purpose 
of either of the aforementioned parties bringing an action 
is to establish a familial relationship for the child and 
have the father of the child support it as do the fathers 
of children born legitimately. By prohibiting one of the 
above named persons to establish paternity for the benefit 
of the child, it is totally inconsistent with the intent and 
meaning of the law. To permit the action secures for the 
child social security benefits of the father, industrial 
compensation, inheritance, etc. To deny this is a judicial 
decree declaring that the child "SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN A 
BASTARD.1' 
POINT 3V 
ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY ARE NOT CONTROLLED 
BY EXISTING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. THE ACT 
ITSELF WAS PURPOSELY SILENT THEREON, AND IT WAS, 
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO HOLD THAT 
THE ACTION WAS SO CONTROLLED. 
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Despite the continuing nature of a father's support 
obligation, the defendant argued in the court below that "/S/n 
essential purpose of the statute of limitati ons is to avoid putting 
a defending party in an untenable position." (R. 6) He further 
argued that because no statute of limitations is found in the body 
of the Uniform Paternity Act, the four year bastardy limitation was 
applicable. With this, the defendant makes two false assumptions. 
First, he falsely assumes that the civil action to establish pater-
nity is governed by any statute of limitations. Secondly, he falsely 
assures that, the limitation under the bastardy statute applies to the 
Unif c m .-irt. 
"* though defendant does have a legitimate concern regarding 
his defence;, tne mere passage of years goes to the weight of the evi-
dence arri rrast, as in most cases, be resolved by judge and jury. Ob-
viously, the longer a plaintifffs delay, the more difficult his burden 
of proof will beccme. As stated by the court in Ortega v. Portales, 
134 Colo. 537, 307 P.2d 193 (1957): 
"The infant child cannot be deprived of 
its right to continued parental care and support 
by failure on the part of any person to act within 
a limited time following its birth. The lapse of 
time may add to the difficulties of proof concern-
ing the essential facts upon which liability may 
depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent 
facts cannot be judicially determined." 
In regard to defendant's first false assumption, the role 
of Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22 has already been discussed. As indi-
cated in that discussion and alluded to here, the Uniform Act on 
Paternity contains no specific limitation period. Had the state. 
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legislature intended to place a time limitation upon the bringing of 
such an action, it would have specifically so provided. Since the 
primary purpose of a paternity proceeding is to secure the support 
aixl education of the child rather than to punish the father, it only 
follows that the legislative intent was to ensure that the child would 
have the right to support during its entire minority. This has long 
been recognized in Utah case law. This court said, in Rockwood v. 
Rpctovood, supra: 
"The duty of the father to support his 
children . . . is imposed in this state by 
positive statute. It voild be his duty in any 
event if there were no statute upon the subject." 
And, in Rees v. Archibald, supra: 
"This court has invariably emphasized the 
father' s obligation to support his children based 
upon the elementary principle that the law imposes 
upon those who bring children into the vjorld the 
duty to care for and support than during their 
minority ard dependency." 
In Rees, Id., this court held that a divorce decree did 
not affect the defendant's responsibility for his son's support and the 
expenses of care given him. In arriving at this holding, the court 
chose that rule of law which gave " . . . primary consideration to 
the rights and needs of the children." Thus, Utah law appears to 
follow the rule that the obligation of a father to support his child, 
legitimate or illegitimate, is continuing and terminates only when the 
child reaches its majority under a provision of the divorce decree or 
paternity order, or 21 years under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1, et 
seq., if the decrees or orders are silent or if there are no orders. 
To apply a statute of limitations not specifi cally provided for by 
the legislature to paternity actions would permit putative fathers to 
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escape his continuing obligation to support "his" child if his child 
it "is." 
^ £EL* Jur* Trials 678-679 discusses the bastardy statutes 
and the evolution of the fact that the Uniform Act on Paternity had no 
limitations- In that discussion is found a definitive statement regard-
ing the lack of a statute of limitations under the Uniform Paternity 
Act; 
"The original bastardy statutes, creating a new 
cause of action, usually established a specific and 
quite short period of time within which the action 
could be brought. In most cases the running of the 
statute started with the birth of the child, and the 
action by the mother had to be brought within a per-
iod of fran one to three years* Seme statutes stipu-
j^zed that an action -could be brought by the local 
,: :ency when the child was or was likely to becane a 
^iic charge. If there was any limitation on the 
~ ringing of such action, the statute usually did not 
begin to run until the child did beccme a public 
charge. 
Usually the statute was tolled by written acknow-
ledgment of paternity or by the furnishing of support. 
The written acknowledgment must have been unequivocal 
and the payment of support reasonably regular, not 
merely sporadic. 
Many if not all of the state laws continue to 
reflect such provisions. However, as the views of 
society in respect to the responsibility of the 
father change37 and after statutes were enactecT mak-
ing it a crime for the father wilfully to fail to 
support an illegitimate child, the theory evolved 
that each day's failure to support constituted a new 
crime; thus, for all practical purposes the statute 
would never run. 
This view is also reflected in seme of the modern 
paternity statutes. The Uniform Paternity Act has no 
limitations on bringing the action, but recovery carTbe 
had only for the necessary support supplied during the 
four years next preceding the carmencecnent of the action." 
(Bnphasis added.) 
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Thus, for something so important, basic, and sacred as 
the establishment of paternity, none of the existing "general" stat-
utes do or can apply. The act itself, as indicated in An. Jur. Trials, 
Id., specifically deleted the limitation because the drafters of that 
law recognized this inherent right of the illegitimate. 
This more enlightened view which ccmports with the policy 
of Utah law giving " . . . primary consideration to the rights and 
needs of the children" has long been applied in other jurisdictions. 
In State of Alabama v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880), a bastardy proceed-
ing wherein no specific statutory limitation had been prescribed in 
the bastardy statute itself, the court stated: 
"We can see good reasons why no statute 
;: limitations was prescribed to bar such proceed-
. ,~;s. They are chiefly intended for the public 
jLTuemnity, and to coerce the putative father to 
support and maintain the unfortunate child." 
111
 State v. Cordrey, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955), the father was 
charged with failure to support his illegitimate child. The court 
recognized non-support as a continuing crime: 
" . . . The defendant in this case is 
charged with non-support which the law recognizes 
as a continuing crime. In crimes of this nature, 
the statute does not begin to run frem the occur-
rence of the initial act, which may in itself en-
body all the elements of the crime, but frcm the 
occurrence of the most recent act. The duty to 
support the child is a contin uing duty and 
the failure to support it is a continuing offense, 
and the parent will be subject to prosecution at 
any time during the continuance of the wilful 
neglect to support the child as provided by the 
statute." 
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A more recent case, State v. Christensen, 19 Ariz. 
App. 479, 503 P.2d 366 (1973), held that a one year statute of limi-
tations on actions on liability created by statute did not bar an 
action by the mother against the alleged father which was brought 
two years after the child fs birth to determine paternity and compel 
support. The Arizona court followed the policy enunciated in State 
v. Nerini, 61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944), where, after observing 
that the bastardy article did not contain sections limiting the time 
in which the proceedings might be instituted, the court cormented: 
"The statute is entirely free frcm any 
bar of this kind, and indeed there should not be, 
for the obligation of a father to support his child, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate, is a continuing 
duty against which limitation will not run during 
the time the child needs such care and support. We 
cannot conceive that the legislature ever intended 
to limit the time in which such proceedings could 
be instituted and prosecuted." 
And, in State v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 427, 13 N.W.2d 26 (1944): 
"The rule that the statute of limitations does 
not run until the liability has ceased to continue 
rests upon the principle that where the obligation 
is continuing in nature the breach or violation of 
duty continues so long as the obligation continues, 
and that the cause of action or penalty, as the case 
may be, must be deemed to be continually accruing 
during the entire time the obligation and the breach 
thereof continue." 
Regarding the second false assuirption, not as much need be 
said. Utah Code Annotated 77-60-15 is a limitation of bastardy pro-
ceedings to 4 years. It says: 
"No prosecution under this Chapter ^^stard^7 
shall be brought after four years frcm the birth of 
such child . . . " (Emphasis and Brackets added.) 
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The defendant himself in his Motion to Dismiss (R, 5) states: "This 
provision is limited to the chapter on bastardy.11 
If the legislature had meant for the four year statute 
to apply to the Uniform Paternity Act, it would have so indicated • 
Furthermore, the more recent act, a Uniform Act, would not likely be 
circumscribed by a state bastardy statute originally passed in 1911. 
Also, Section 78-45a-3 would be rendered meaningless if the four year 
statute were to govern. The language "rarmencement of an action" with 
a liability limitation of four years thereon strongly implies that more 
than one action could be brought—this being so, application of the four-
year statute would be incongruous. 
Surely, if the legislature and the authors of the Uniform 
Paternity Act had wanted to limit the time within which paternity could 
be established either by the act itself or through use of the Bastardy 
Act, they would have so provided. A matter of such importance would 
not have been deleted without a good reason—that reason being that the 
basic rights of all children and the duty of fathers to provide for 
their support should not be subject to arbitrary, unjust limitations 
which would bar the child frcm exercising its rights to parental es-
tablishment. 
POINT V 
IF ANY STATUTE OF LU4ITATI0NS IS FOUND TO 
CONTROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED DURING THE 
CHILD'S MINORITY AND AN ACTION BROUGHT DURING 
THE MINORITY OF THE CSHD IS PROPER. 
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Should this court find that the eight year (or any other 
length) statute of limitation controls paternity actions, such limi-
tations do not bar the bringing of the action during the child's 
minority. Whether the mother, child, or public agency charged with 
the child's support initiates and brings the action does not matter. 
The "real" party in interest in all of the above situations is only one 
person—the child. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-35 (b) (1) makes it clear that 
the limitation period does not run during minority. The pertinent 
language is i3 follows: 
"If a person entitled to bring an action . . . 
at the time the cause of action accrued under 
;. :- age of majority the tire of such disability is 
" " a oart of the tir.e limited for the coitmencanent 
. the action." (Rxfoasis added.) 
The present action frcs this category exactly. The child 
was eight years and two days old when the ac tion was filed. The child 
has 10 years remaining for its minority. Pursuant to the above stat-
ute, the limitation of time is tolled until majority is reached. How-
ever, in analysis of the foregoing, it is called to the court's atten-
tion that Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-2 allows the mother, public 
agency, or child to bring the action in its own name, or together. In 
connection therewith, the child has a right to bring the action and, 
thus, by the language of 78-12-36 (b) (1), the period is tolled. 
The argument undoubtedly will be raised that the suit is 
brought in the name of the state and the mother and not that of the 
child. Therefore, since neither the state nor the mother are in their 
minority, the statute of limitations should run. -Appellants would like 
-21-
to respond to this in the following iranner: 
If this court agrees with the above provision, the mother 
could petition the court to be appointed guardian-ad-liteu. In essence, 
she is doing now in her own name the same thing she would do as a 
"guardian-ad-litena," which is to pursue the interests of the child. 
Further, as indicated previously, the "real" party, no matter whose 
name appears on the title of the action, is the "child" and not the 
mother or the State of Utah. Of course, the State would benefit 
financially because of the fact that an established paternity would 
permit collection of support from the natural father when the child is 
on welfare. However, the greater benefit derived directly by the 
child greatly outweighs the few dollars collected for welfare reim-
bursement • 
The California Supreme Court, in Van Buskirk v. Todd, 269 
Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Bptr. 280 (1969), followed appellant's 
position, above. In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child 
initiated an action to determine paternity through a bastardy action. 
The court held that a bastardy action should be considered frcm the 
standpoint of the child as the real party in interest, and that the 
statute of limitations in the paternity phase of such an action is 
tolled at all times from the birth of the child until his majority, 
or until an action for paternity is brought on his behalf. The 
court also stated that the tolling of the statute during the minority 
of the child in question was not terminated by the bringing of an 
earlier paternity-support action which was voluntarily dismissed by 
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the child's representative. The court analogized the instant case 
to one in which a guardian ad litem voluntarily discontinues an 
action brought on behalf of an infant, and where the general rule is 
that the rights of the infant are not prejudiced thereby, and that 
he may still take advantage of his disability, the action not being 
barred until the lapse of the statutory period after he beccmes of 
age. 
Further, the same court reiterated its position in 1971 
when it decided Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal* App. 3c} 870, 97 Cal. Rptr. 
920 (1971). An attempt to have the paternity action defeated by 
laches was there encountered by the court. The court said that in an 
action to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child and to ob-
tain support for that child, brought by x±se mother on behalf of the 
child, the child is the real party in interest, and the statute of 
limitations on the paternity aspect of the case is tolled during 
the minority of the child. The court stated that the obligation 
of a father to support his child, whether legitimate or illegiti-
mate, is a continuing duty against which th e statute of limitations 
does not run during the time that the child needs such support. 
The court felt that the result would be no different if the ccmplaint 
was indeed considered to raise equitable issued, since the action 
would be brought on the child's behalf, all benefits derived frcm 
it would belong to the child, and therefore laches could not be 
imputed to the child during its minority• 
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Appellants contend that the two preceding California cases 
present the law this court should follow. Since the right to support 
does belong to the child and could, under the lower court ruling, 
forever be lost through no fault of his own at the age of eight years, 
the action should be considered frcm the standpoint of the child as the 
real party in interest. Where, as in the instant case, the person is 
affected by a recognized legal disability and a continuing duty of 
support exists, the interests of the child and society must not be 
limited by an arbitrary imposition of statutory limitation during a 
child13 minority. 
co^cmsiai-
t~a interests of illegitimate children should be of great 
concern of this court. In a day and age where more illegitimacy oc-
curs, the natural fathers who indiscriminately feel sex is a play 
toy should be required to support those children they bring into the 
world. To prohibit this frcm taking place, the taxpayers of this 
state will be called upon to support more and more children "whose 
fathers can hide behind the technical cloak of the law." 
It is appellants1 position that the lower court mast be 
reversed and the complaint reinstated so as to allow discovery pro-
cesses to take place to determine the actual paternity of the child. 
There is nothing more basic to our society than to have that right. 
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